MICHEL MARTIN, HOST:
For more on this, we've called Richard Haass. He is a veteran diplomat, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and author of a weekly Substack newsletter called Home & Away. Good morning, Mr. Haass. Thanks for joining us once again.
RICHARD HAASS: Good morning, Michel.
MARTIN: So what is the Trump administration telling the world by seizing an oil tanker off the coast of Venezuela?
HAASS: Well, I think if you tie this into the recently released national security strategy, it essentially signals the world that in the Western Hemisphere, we are going to act - I'll put it diplomatically - with great independence, some might say - critics might use the word impunity - to promote ends to advance interests as we see them. And in this case, there's obviously an interest in bringing about a change in regime in Venezuela. And as Steve just commented, this is one way of - what? - escalating, graduating, incrementally increasing the pressure on the government.
MARTIN: And can we talk briefly about the oil, as Steve and Steve just mentioned? A reporter asked Trump at the White House on Wednesday what happens to the oil on the ship. He said that he doesn't know. The Maduro regime is calling this piracy, which suggests that this is about taking the oil. What do you think?
HAASS: Well, the oil that really matters is not the oil on the tanker. When you think about what might be motivating the United States in Venezuela, it doesn't seem to really be drugs. Venezuela is not a central player in the drug trade, certainly not the fentanyl trade. Already 8 million or so people have left Venezuela, but that flow is largely stopped. I think the biggest rationale for the United States promoting regime change is to get at Venezuelan oil reserves. They're the world's largest. At the moment, they're hardly producing anything at all, only a million barrels a day. They could produce many times that. And I think this administration, which puts economic interests in the forefront of its foreign policy, is very interested in getting a regime in power that would invite American companies to come in. So I - more than anything else, I think it's the oil on the ground, not the oil on the tanker that really matters.
MARTIN: Interesting. So looking broadly at this pressure campaign, we've had sanctions, strikes on suspected drug smugglers, a fleet of warships in the Caribbean. If the goal is regime change, do you think that the administration can actually achieve that?
HAASS: Well, that's the question. You do it through honey and vinegar. The honey is you offer the Maduro regime a safe passage out. They can go live at some Club Med (ph) in Havana, and the pressure is - increases. And it could be, for example, targeted strikes on certain installations that are close to the political center of the regime. The problem with this kind of escalation, with this kind of coercion, is it means that you're waiting for the Venezuelan government to say uncle. And the question is, if they don't say uncle, then the onus is on you to escalate. And this administration, I don't think, is particularly anxious for a large military involvement in Venezuela.
MARTIN: Are there downsides to regime change for the United States?
HAASS: Well, there's always the downside that you don't necessarily know what you get afterwards. You've got a democratic opposition in Venezuela, but you've got other forces in that country. So you can't be assured that the transition is smooth, and what you end up with is people reading the Federalist Papers, in this case, in Spanish. The history of regime change, shall we say, is quite difficult, and often it takes a long time to consolidate something that is, you know, measurably better than what you had.
MARTIN: Before we let you go, very briefly, the president also said - sort of issued a sort of a vague warning to Colombia, saying, you know, you're next. What do you think that means?
HAASS: Well, again, I think it reinforces the sense that we see the Western Hemisphere as a priority as our backyard. I don't think it'll be well received in the hemisphere, but guess what? It might be well received in both Moscow and in Beijing 'cause they like the idea that this administration increasingly sees the world in terms of spheres of influence - we can do what we want to do here. But that suggests Russia can do what it wants to do in Europe, and China can do it in Asia.
MARTIN: Lots to talk about here. That's Richard Haass. He's president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. Richard Haass, thanks so much for joining us once again.
HAASS: Thank you. Transcript provided by NPR, Copyright NPR.
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